4 Problems of U.S. Intelligence

In the process of describing the directors responsible for leading the Central Intelligence Agency since its inception after World War II, The Spymasters by Chris Whipple lays bare at least four systemic problems that affect the intelligence that supports policy decisions affecting U.S.national security. 1) Conflicting attitudes toward analysts, covert operators, technology, a mole/spy (Rick Ames and earlier, James Jesus Angleton's search for spies within CIA) and women affect the agency's morale, hiring, firing and intelligence reports. President Nixon's CIA director, James Schlesinger, purged covert operators left over from the Vietnam era; President Reagan's CIA director, William Casey, himself a covert operator during World War II, hired 2000. Casey ended up in the scandalous plot, where contra guerrillas, funded from arms sales to Iran that were used to free U.S. hostages, fought to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Presudent Carter's CIA director, Stansfield Turner, favored using technology rather than human intelligence collection methods. James Woolsey, President Clinton's first CIA director, however, recognized the value of integrating technology and human intelligence. Until relatively recently, CIA was "white, male and Yale." Appointed by President Trump, Gina Haspel, the first female CIA director, came up through the covert Directorate of Operations. Jennifer Matthews, who joined the CIA in 1989, was one of the analysts in the secret unit, Alec Station, that had warned President George W. Bush's administration of an impending Al Qaeda attack on the United States. At age 45, Ms. Matthews told family and friends she needed an overseas covert assignment in order to progress professionaly. As chief of base in Khost, Afghanistan, she was killed in a suicide bombing in December, 2009. 2) Turf wars, at a time when available information abounds, prevent innovations capable of capturing, evaluating and distributing relevant information, the lack of which can have dire consequences. On paper, responsibilities of the CIA, FBI, other U.S. agencies and departments, embassies and foreign intelligence services seem clear. But in the U.S. alone, the CIA and FBI have conflicting responsibilities, and there are conflicts between the FBI's need to collect evidence to prosecute offenders in court cases and the CIA's need to take timely action on intelligence information. For example, the CIA's Jose Rodriguez justified use of waterboarding and other "enhanced interrogation techniques" as the fastest way to get Al Qaeda terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, to disclose plans for additional attacks that required immediate prevention. He had no respect for the interrogation method of the FBI's Ali Soufan, who, as an Arabic-speaking Muslim, gained information by establishing personal rapport with terrorists. (See Lawrence Wright's very different positive profile of Ali Soufan in The Looming Tower). Both the CIA and FBI knew Al Qaeda was behind the October, 2000 attack on the USS Cole destroyer in Aden, Yemen, but the Clinton administration's failure to react emboldened Osama bin Laden's September 11, 2001 attacks. What surfaced as one of the consensus reasons for 9/11 in the postmortem was a lack of intelligence sharing. As a remedy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was designed to integrate not only the CIA and FBI, but also the National Security Agency, Department of Energy and another 10 contributors to U.S. intelligence. Of course, even this cumbersome Office does not collect, evaluate and coordinate intelligence information supplied by other sources, such as NATO, the UK and Israel. A year before the August, 1998 Al Qaeda attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, the FBI learned CIA discounted the warning of a bombing plot an Egyptian member of Al Qaeda provided at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. In contrast, acting on a tip from Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate, CIA relied on a would-be double agent, Human Khalil al-Balawi, who presented a video showing he could get close to Al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al Zawahiri. On December 30, 2009, Balawi, who turned out to be a suicide bomber and triple agent working for Al Qaeda, set off the explosion that killed Jennifer Matthews and her team in Khost, Afghanistan. 3) CIA and Presidents navigate a difficult relationship. Separating those who provide and those who use information is a mistake, when collaboration is likely to produce a much better conclusion. Within the administrations of U.S. Presidents, policy decisions are based on political calculations, incomplete intelligence information, the clash of personalities and opinions and often an attempt to provide deniability and avoid blame, if a decision launches an action that goes wrong. Political suspicions linger, for example, regarding President Clinton's reluctance to retaliate for Al Qaeda's attack on the USS Cole. Acknowledging Al Qaeda crippled a U.S. destroyer could have made Democrats look weak a month before the 2000 election. Plus, with President Clinton's Monica Lewinsky affair fresh in the minds of voters, a retalitory strike on Al Qaeda could look like an effort to distract from the affair, an imitation of the film plot in Wag the Dog. The experience of CIA directors and their staffs is too valuable to exclude from the policy-making loop. Consider the positions held by these CIA directors. James Schlesinger: Secretary of Defense George H. W. Bush: U.S. President William Webster: FBI director Robert Gates: Secretary of Defense John Deutch: Deputy Secretary of Defense George Tenet: Deputy CIA director Michael Hayden: National Security Agency director Leon Panetta: Member of Congress, President Clinton's White House Chief of Staff and OMB director, Secretary of Defense Mike Pompeo: Member of Congress, Secretary of State Yet, the principals in positions to take control during a new crisis may fail to give sufficient attention to a looming problem, if their attention is focused on erroneous information about a different threat and/or if they fail to understand the country or group involved. After George W. Bush won the 2000 presidential election, the CIA continued to voice grave concern about the growing Al Qaeda threat, but the president's advisors: Vice President Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz at the Defense Department and National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, were preoccupied with Iraq. Pretending Iraq's Saddam Husein was connected with Al Qaeda and had weapons of mass destruction led to a disasterous war. From their positions of power, Presidents often try to use the information and tools CIA can provide to implement their will. During the Vietnam war, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon asked CIA director, Richard Helms, to violate the CIA's lack of authority to engage in domestic police activities by beginning a domestic surveillance program, MHCHAOS, designed to identify the communist connections of anti-war protest leaders in the United States. After I left CIA in 1967, I lived in Honolulu for a time. While I was on a date with a Hawaiian assistant attorney general, he asked if I were willing to compile a list of anti-war leaders at Hawaii's East-West University, if the government paid for my Ph.D. studies. I was unwilling. Just as CIA directors need to avoid being intimidated by Presidents, they need to be careful not to use their own power to intimidate their staffs. When a crisis erupts, the CIA hierarchy has a tendency to leave analysts who monitor a country or subject out in the cold, while over and over again the same top tier officials assemble to consider options. After Russia invaded the former Soviet Union's Republic of Georgia in August, 2008, CIA director, Michael Hayden, asked (I hope, in jest.), if CIA had an expert on Georgia. Clearly, the Georgia analyst who followed the country every day was not the first person asked for an assessment. John Brennan was an Irish Catholic and White House counterrorism advisor before he became the CIA director. To confine him to an information-only lane would not make sense. National security depends on a CIA that provides information it knows to be true(and legal), not to robotically go along with every request from Presidents and their administrations. 4) Just as political considerations play a role in the relationship between presidents and CIA directors, they also affect Congressional relations. The title, Playing to the Edge, of the book by George W. Bush's CIA director, Michael Hayden, captures the intelligence community's mindset. Compared to covert operators determined to stretch the legal limits to complete a mission, most legislators are attorneys schooled in a strict rule of law. Blame for poor CIA-Congressional relations, cannot be assigned to CIA alone, however. By August, 2016, Russian interference with the U.S. election process was clear. But when President Obama's CIA officials asked Congressional leaders to warn their State election commissions about foreign tampering, they were told to stop being played by Moscow. Wavering views on assassinations can serve as a proxy for understanding complex Congressional and CIA positions. In 1973, Congress looked at CIA's involvement in plots to assassinate four foreign leaders: Fidel Castro, Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem, the Congo's Patrice Lumumba and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. As a result of these investigations, Congress established oversight by House and Senate Permanent Committees on Intelligence. In the 1980s, the Middle East's unsettled Israeli-Palestinian conflict and U.S. support for Iran's Shah inspired vengeance by Islamic fundamentalists. A CIA manhunt eventually killed an elusive terrorist leader of Iranian-backed Hezbollah, Imad Mughniyah, who promoted effective suicide bombings and the kidnapping and torture of U.S. citizens. When pressure against what was perceived as torture by CIA operatives gained public support after 9/11, Congress condemned the "enhanced interrogation techniques" used on Al Qaeda terrorists and passed the "Detainee Treatment Act" in 2005. But, even as early as 2001, assassinations began to go unchallenged, when they could be accomplished from afar by drones. And crowds gathered outside the White House to cheer the assassination of Osama bin Landen in May, 2011. The U.S. public and Congress agreed to take action for Saudi Arabia's role in the dismemberment of Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, in Iran's Saudi Arabian Embassy, but President Trump was reluctant to lose a $450 billion sale to the Saudis. Yet, President Trump authorized the murder of Iranian general, Qassim Suleimani, head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Quds Force. How Congress and the public will view future assassinations remains unclear. Although eliminating a dangerous leader appears to accomplish a mission, such a short-term remedy often poses worse long-term consequences. President Clinton's first CIA director, James Woolsey, recognized the dilemma. He described how a giant, after slaying a dragon, suddenly can discover he is surrounded by poisonous snakes. The death of one kingpin does not prevent more than one from taking his place. Finally, no one book provides a complete review of the tools, procedures, limitations and capabilities the U.S. intelligence community uses to protect national security. As Chris Whipple surely knows, the CIA directors and others he interviewed for The Spymasters are motivated to protect their legacies and the integrity of the Central Intelligence Agency. Their perceptions also reflect their personalities and loyalty to and chemistry with associates. Predictably, CIA's current director, Gina Haspel, and Michael Pompeo, the current Secretary of State and Ms. Haspel's predecessor, declined to be interviewed, since anything they would say could have repercussions related to their ongoing responsibilities. It was unfortunate to see the good ol' white, male and Yale CIA boys use Ms. Haspel's lack of response to an interview request as an opportunity to take their long knives to her experience, decisions and behavior. In the final analysis, however, The Spymasters reminds citizens of democracies how free they are to discover the way their governments work and how free they are to correct what they dislike.

Inform Career Preparation

Lessons from current events and research findings can prevent career preparation mistakes.

     China's President funded facial recognition technology to control the country, and suddenly the coronavirus required masks. In the United States, voters in primary elections discounted presidential candidate Andrew Yang's plan to give $1000 a month to every citizen over 18 years of age. A few months later, they received a $1200 check from President Trump. Research Robert Plomin presents in Blueprint shows genes have an important influence on a child's propensity to excel in certain fields, but some parents risk criminal prosecution to bribe their students ' admission into prestigious colleges unsuited to their normal development.

     Several examples suggest productive ways to think about preparing for careers in the rapidly changing future.

      As world stock markets tumble, Scottish investment firm, Baillie Gifford, prospers. By purchasing stocks in companies whose stock prices fell because  they channeled profits into preparations for online sales, Baillie Gifford willingly sacrificed short term gains for a future when stores would lose out to channels serving online customers. As a high school student, becoming a dependable employee in an unglamourous, low-paying position can be the way to a credit card and a bank loan for higher education or a business of your own. Shark Tank Daymond John spent years working at Red Lobster to help finance his first fashion business.

     Skills are transferable.

     Erik Larson's current book about Churchill tells how Lord Beaverbrook, the head of a publishing empire, became head of England's Ministry of Aircraft Production in World War II. He felt manufacturing executives in one industry could master another, just as knowing the basics of one religion enabled someone to grasp the principles of another faith. This summer, the lucky student interns working at home in virtual positions for one company are gaining the valuable skills needed to fill virtual positions likely to expand in many companies throughout the global business world.

     Walk back the cat.

     Consider how the management structure NASA developed to win the race to the moon, the structure being replicated to develop a COVID-19 vaccine in the US, applies to career planning. Beginning with the objective, do what intelligence agencies do when they are trying uncover a spy. They begin "walking back the cat" to see who had access to the information that caused a project to fail, whom those people knew, and so forth. I don't know if Barack Obama operated this way, but, if he did, he would have said to himself, "I would like to be President of the United States." What should I do? I need to show I can win an elected, high-level political office. I will run for the Senate. Who supports and funds this kind of campaign. Where should I attend college to meet the people who provide that kind of support, and so forth. Whether someone has a clear objective to be an astronaut, a president, a movie star or a millionaire, he or she needs to begin today to: 1) trace back the steps needed to reach that goal and 2) take the first step.

If You See Something, Say Something

Voters in the United States are learning more about the contacts between President Trump's administration and Russia. In Ben Macintyre's 2018 book, The Spy and the Traitor, they can learn what a country is capable of doing to its enemies:

• Gather and analyze information about enemies
• Recruit informants, agents, and double agents who are: lonely; hurt by fate or nature (they might be ugly or short); have inferiority complexes; crave power, influence, a promotion; need money; can be compromised/blackmailed
• Aid a spy's career by helping him or her rise to positions that provide greater access to information and to influence on polity decisions
• Infiltrate anti-government movements
• Deploy "illegals" who live as ordinary citizens in foreign countries, are more difficult to detect by counterintelligence investigation than spies under diplomatic or consular cover, and can be mobilized for any purpose
• Employ methods to avoid surveillance
• Create escape/exfiltration routes for a spy who is compromised
• Provide secret communication and copying equipment for spies
• Establish sites where secret information about where to meet or when can be signaled to spies in plain sight, such as by chalk marks on mailboxes or orange peels under park benches
• Establish secret dead drop sites for hiding messages or money without personal contact with spies
• Transfer information to spies during an undetected quick brush pass by another person
• Manipulate media to influence public opinion, create fake news, cultivate officials and opinion makers sympathetic to a cause
•  Provide disinformation; create false evidence about foreign dangers, such as packages of arms labeled "Made in China"; provide inflammatory posters
• Forge documents and foreign currency
• Implement sabotage, supply arms
• Bug homes and offices
• Kidnap, drug, torture, kill

Conclusion: As long as a country has enemies, citizens are not free to accept everything they see at face value. They need to report their suspicions to authorities. 

How to Recruit a Spy

It's no secret. Recruiting a spy is as easy as M.I.C.E. Michael V. Hayden, former head of the CIA, wrote in his book, Playing to the Edge, spies are recruited through Money, Ideology, Compromise, and Ego.

Prime targets are those:

• who need money because they can't pay their gambling or other debts,
• who believe their country's system of government relies on a bankrupt ideology,
• who can be blackmailed (compromised) because they harbor sexuality, stealing, or other secrets they want to hide,
• who have bruised egos because they feel they have been unfairly fired, passed over for a promotion, or ignored even though they are smarter than everyone else.

Conversely, if you don't want to be recruited as a spy, don't fall into these traps.

Secret Codes

If you communicate with emojis, you might be using a secret code that people who speak another language can understand, but some who speak your own language can't. That's the essence of secret codes. You send information you intend someone to understand and hide your messages from everyone else. Of course, spies do this all the time. They report plans, troop movements, economic conditions, and the health and characteristics of key officials enemies want to hide.

     Not only is it necessary to write secrets in code and in things like lemon juice that disappears until the paper its written on is heated, but methods for sending messages also are important. Short radio bursts are used and messages are hidden in James Bond-type devices. During the Revolutionary War, Nathan Hale, considered the first U.S. spy, unfortunately  hid a secret message in his boot which was easily discovered when he was caught by the British.

     You and a friend might make up a secret code that gives words different meanings or uses the third letter in every word to make a sentence when those third letters are written together. If you want to send your message during a class, how would you get it to your friend three rows away? Or you might wrap a long strip of paper around a baseball bat, write your message vertically on the paper, unwind the paper and hide it somewhere. In order to read your message, a friend would have to wind the paper around a bat that was the same size as yours.

     Decoding mistakes can happen. In 1916, Elizabeth Wells Gallup claimed she found coded messages from Sir Francis Bacon hidden in Shakespeare's scripts. Using only words written in one particular typeface, she found a message Bacon left in Richard II that led her to believe he said he wrote the play. When Elizabeth and William Friedman looked at Gallup's work in 1955, they found the different typefaces she relied on were caused by accidental primitive printing technology, not the intentional work of Bacon or anyone else.

     Suppose you and a friend have a secret meeting or message hiding place. Spies have left messages in pumpkins, under bridges, under floor boards, and in bottles in the hollows of trees. You can signal your friend that you want to meet or you have left a message by methods similar to those spies have used. Where spies have put chalk marks on mail boxes, you could put a chalk mark on a friend's locker. Instead of putting a flower pot on a balcony, you could put a toy at your window or blink a flashlight. Slaves escaping on the Underground Railroad used to look for safe houses that had statues positioned in a certain way out front.

     Fans of Harry Potter know his owl Hedwig carried secret messages. Homing pigeons performed the same task in wartime. Could you train a pet to do the job?

     Secret codes often are very difficult to decipher. Letters carved into the sculpture, "Krypto," outside the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency remained a puzzle until an analyst spent eight years on his lunch hours using pencil and paper to figure out three of the sections on the stone. Even then, what the message meant was unclear. The movie, The Imitation Game, showed how Germans in World War II created an impossible to crack Enigma code that caused a British decoder at its secret Bletchley facility to build a computer to try millions of letter combinations. That didn't work until one person realized each transmission began with a weather report. By comparing each day's weather with the letters used in that day's secret message the number of combinations the computer had to try was reduced and messages Germans sent regarding enemy ships they intended to destroy could be read faster.

     Nowadays, it is possible to both code and decode secret messages by computer. It also is possible to hack into messages sent by computer unless security measures, such as the use of secure passwords and default passwords, are taken. TIME magazine (Nov. 7, 2016) reported that on October 21, 2016 cyber hackers even tapped into the unsecured Internet of Things (remotely controlled internet connected surveillance cameras, printers, digital video recorders) and used them to activate a virus, Mirai, (the Japanese word for "the future") that overwhelmed servers at one company with malicious traffic that prevented legitimate users from reaching intended receivers. The tasks of preparing a truly secret code and transferring secret codes are becoming more difficult every day.

(For more information about how emojis communicate, see the earlier post, "Communicate without Words.")

Empower Yourself: Know Your Enemy

When facing a bully, an unfair teacher or police officer, an angry parent or one who ignores you, a potential employer, or a terrorist group, what is the natural reaction? Cower in a corner, plot revenge, accept the enemy's position and join the opposition?

     Only by understanding an enemy can you gain confidence in tailoring an effective approach to each situation. Bill Gates was said to know more about his competitors' products than his competitors did. One size does not fit all, when dealing with enemies.

     In his book, Playing to the Edge, Michael V. Hayden, who headed two U.S. intelligence agencies, explained the MICE system for recruiting spies. Those close to enemy leaders who are willing to betray their countries are not motivated by one thing. Some want Money; some share your Ideology; some are Compromised because they are about to be exposed for something they did; and some who have a huge Ego feel they aren't appreciated. Different motivations require different approaches.

     U.S. President Lyndon Johnson knew exactly what each member of the U.S. Senate wanted (a bridge in his home state, a trip to Europe with his wife, a certain committee assignment), when he was Senate majority leader. On the other hand, his failure to understand the motivation of Vietnam's revolutionary leader had dire consequences,

     Wednesday Marten gained the results she wanted, when she decided to study the social elite who were ignoring her on New York City's upper East Side. She wrote in Primates of Park Avenue how her study enabled her to join Manhattan's high society. Victims of bullying might benefit by studying popular kids.

     Without an understanding of an enemy's culture, however, Michael Morell, a former director at the Central Intelligence Agency, pointed out in the New York Times Opinion section (August 5, 2016) how easy it is to fall into an enemy's trap. Those ignorant of the point of view of Muslim extremists who see themselves engaged in a holy religious war against the secular West live up to this enemy stereotype with every anti-Muslim position they take and every anti-Muslim statement they make. If the enemy likes what you are doing, he may compliment you and you will keep on doing his bidding. What does a young man do, if a gang leader compliments him for killing a rival gang member?

     By putting together bits and pieces of the present, it even is possible to understand good and bad futures before they occur. In his book, Submission, Michel Houellebecq anticipates how an Islamic party would go about winning an election and imposing Islamic law in France. Such knowledge, actually any knowledge about an enemy, really is power.

(The idea of understanding an enemy also is discussed in the earlier blog post, "Fight, Flight, or Something Else.")

   

         

The Next War?

Throw out traditional texts on military strategy, if you count cyberwarfare which already has begun and the war envisioned by the February, 2016 Munich Security Conference.

   The Munich Conference expects future wars will engage killer robots with GPS guidance systems, facial-recognition technology, and artificial intelligence that wouldn't get tired, scared, or hungry and wouldn't retreat. Some suggest these robots would be less dangerous and more precise than land mines or nuclear bombs.

      But others warn that the same hackers who can alter data in electrical grids, hospitals, and financial markets could disrupt what military robots will do. Also, hackers could disrupt the so-called Internet of Things (IoT): cars, elevators, thermostats, refrigerators and other appliances that are directed by smart chips. For example, they could turn the IoT into spies on enemies.